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insigni cantlevels.  islast ndingimpliesthatthebroaderpoliticalcontextcan
aﬀectthestrengthofthehabituationprocessinpublicopinion.
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xiiiWe must make our choice. We may have democracy, or we















parties(Gelmanetal.     ,Brooksetal.     ). Ontheotherhand,theglassis
half-empty: inequalitydoesnotalwaysproducepopularoppositiontoit,andin
factitisalmostneveropposedtotheextentthatwewouldpredictifcitizensacted
onlyintheireconomicself-interest(LaddandBowman    ,KluegelandSmith
    ,PageandJacobs    ). Incross-nationalcomparisons,moreunequal
countriesdonotexhibitsystematicallyhigherpopularoppositiontoinequality
(AlesinaandGlaeser    ,KenworthyandMcCall    ),andincreasing
inequalityovertimeintheUnitedStateshasnotsystematicallyresultedin
increasingoppositiontoit(McCall    ).  isistrueeventhoughthevast
majorityofcitizensdonotbene tfromrecentincreasesinincomeinequality,the
gainsofwhichareconcentratedattheverytopoftheincomedistribution




























²A similar concept, the adaptation hypothesis, has been previously discussed by Listhaug










 .  O                   
RecentincreasesinincomeinequalityintheUnitedStatesaswellasother




citizens(Gilens    ),anditappearsthat(asmightbeexpected)thepolicy
preferencesoftheverywealthydivergeinimportantrespectsfromthoseofmost
Americans(Pageetal.     ). Moregenerally,higheconomicinequalityhasbeen
linkedtonumerousimportantoutcomesinthecomparativepoliticsliterature,
includingdemocraticand/orregimeinstability(Karl    ,Muller    ,
AcemogluandRobinson    ,Boix    ),reducedpublicgoodsprovision
(Andersonetal.     )andincreasedlevelsofviolenceinwar(Nepaletal.







































itdoesnotchallengeourbeliefthattheworldisfair(LernerandMiller    ,Jost



























Project(ISSP);analysisof  countriescon rmsthatindividualperceptions
³ isobservationisnotintendedtoimplythatthe‘valueadded’byCEO’sislowerorhigher
























follow-upsurveyexperiment,describedinChapter .  isexperimentshows
thatwhenthemotivationtobelieveinajustworldisexperimentallyactivated,




































E                                  ofsocietieswhereaneconomic
surplusisproduced. Assuch,ithasbeenatopicofinterestforobserversof






















   .  T                                                 





















here. However, I consider it indisputable that in every country for which ISSP data is available,























   .  W                     ?
AsnotedbyShapiro(    ),ifthepoorareto“soaktherich”,theyneedtobe


















Marx(    [    ])expectedthat,asthegapinthestandardsofliving












instabilityofdemocraticregimesintheregion(Karl,    ). Intwoprominent















(MeltzerandRichard    ),butalsoformsanexplicitstartingpointfor
qualitativestudiesintothepoliticala itudesofthepoor. Lane(    )and
Hochschild(    ),forexample,basetheirinquiriesintowhythepoordonot
objectmoretotheirdeprivedpositionontheexplicitassumptionthatitwould
makeeconomicsenseforthepoortodoso. Morerecently,debatesregardingthe




















oftheirwealthycitizens. Solt(    )concludes,basedonacross-national
analysis,that“higherlevelsofincomeinequalitypowerfullydepresspolitical
interest,thefrequencyofpoliticaldiscussion,andparticipationinelections
amongallbutthemostaﬄuentcitizens”.⁴ Inaddition,Solt(    )showsthat
incomeinequalityinU.S.statesisassociatedwithlowerturnoutandagreater




States: Bartels(    ,Ch. )showsthatsenatorsaremoreresponsivetothe




evidence(Pageetal.     ),itappearsthatthesuper-richholdpreferencesthat
occasionallydivergeinimportantwaysfromthoseoftheaverageAmerican
⁴Solt(    ,p.  ).
⁵Karabarbounis(    ,p.   ).




encouragingsideofthepicture,Schlozmanetal. (    )showthatwhileratesof
voting,a endingmeetingsanddoingcampaignworkareallrelatedto
socio-economicstatus,thesewell-knowndisparitieshavenotincreasedoverthe







relatedtotheincreaseinincomeinequality.”⁶ Manza(    )reachesthesame
conclusion,pointingoutthatgiving(forallpurposes,includingpolitical)among
thewealthyhasincreasedintheeraofrisinginequality,andthatthishasenabled
thesuper-richtoincreasetheir“investment”inpolitics.⁷ BothBartels(    ,




⁶Schlozmanetal. (    ,pp.   - ).






















⁸Gilens(    ,p.   ).
⁹APSATaskForceReport(    ,p.   ).
  inequality.  isoptionbringsusbacktotheneedtobe erunderstandtheimpact
that(informationabout)economicinequalityhasonpublicopinion,andhow
opinioninfavorofeitherincreasingordecreasingeconomicinequalityisformed.
















linkedtolowerlevelsofsocialtrust(You    ),reducedsocialsolidarityand
willingnesstohelpothers(PaskovandDewilde    ),reducedsupportfor
secularizationofpublicoﬃceholdersandmoresupportforthein uenceof
  religiousleadersinpolitics(KarakocandBaskan    ),reducedtoleranceof
homosexuality(AndersenandFetner    ),reducedsocialaﬃnityacrosssocial
classes(LupuandPontusson    )andincreasednationalismamongthe
(ethnicallydivided)poor,resultinginlesssupportforredistribution(Shayo







hypothesizedtoin uencenon-a itudinaloutcomes. Forexample,economists
havestudiedtherelationshipofeconomicgrowthandeconomicinequalitywith
mixedresults(see orbecke    ,Pontusson    ,orVoitchovsky    for
reviews)anditisasofnowunclearwhattherelationshipisandwhichfactorsmay
moderateit. Incomparativepolitics,Nepaletal. (    )showthatinequalityis
relatedtoincreasedlevelsofviolenceintheNepalicivilwar,whileFearonand
Laitin(    )arguethatinequalityisnotrelatedtothelikelihoodofacivilwar
breakout. IntheAmericanse ing,Frank(    )hasarguedthatrisinginequality
pushesthemiddleclassintoanunaﬀordableraceforpositionalgoodsbyshi ing
theframeofreferencethatde nesconsumptionstandards(seealsoFranketal.










Galeaetal. (    ) ndthatincomeinequalityislinkedtoincreasedmortality
rates,Kennedyetal. (    )showthatthereisanassociationofstateincome
inequalitywithpoorhealthoutcomesontheindividuallevel,andKahnetal.
(    ) ndthatinequalityisassociatedwithworsehealthoutcomesforpoor
mothers. However,DeatonandLubitsky(    ,    )arguethattherelationship
ofeconomicinequalityandpublichealthisspuriousand,inthecontextofU.S.
states,disappearswhencontrollingforproportionblackinthepopulation. While
SubramanianandKawachi(    )includestateproportionblackandstill nda
relationshipbetweenincomeinequalityandhealthoutcomesintheU.S.,
Beck eld(    )usesalargecross-nationalsampleand ndsnoconnection
betweenpopulationhealthandincomeinequalityoncecountry xed-eﬀectsare
included. MellorandMilyo(    )controlforindividual-aswellas
regional-levelcharacteristicsand ndnorelationshipbetweenhealthstatusand
incomeinequalityintheUnitedStates. Carefulreviews(seeNeckermanand
Torche    ,KawachiandKennedy    andLeighetal.     )concludethat
  thereiscurrentlynosolidevidencethatinequalityitselfaﬀectshealthoutcomes.










    ’s. Startinga erthe    -  recession,topincomesintheUShave
increasedtogetherwiththeshareofincomescapturedbythetopofthe
distribution(Go schalkandDanziger,    ,Ch. ).  ispa ernholdsupwith
severaldiﬀerentoperationalizationsofincome(Brandolini    ). Similar
changeshavebeendocumentedacrossEnglish-speakingcountries(Pike yand
Saez    ),andmorerecentlyalsoinpartsofcontinentalEurope(Smeeding
    ). TopincomeshareshavealsoincreasedinwelfarestateslikeNorway
¹⁰Leighetal. (    ,p.   ).
¹¹For example, Falk et al. (    ) show that experiencing an unfair payment has adverse car-
diovascularconsequences. Mendelsonetal(    )showthatbeingassignedtoalowstatuscon-
ditionhasanegativeimpactonstress-relatedphysiologicalsystems. Kondoetal(    ) ndthat
relativedeprivationamongJapaneseadultsisassociatedwithpoorself-ratedhealth.
¹²Forreviewsontheoriginsoftheincreaseineconomicinequality,seeMahler(    ),Stepan
andLinz(    )andHackerandPierson(    ).
  (Atkinson    )and,ifcapitalgainsareincludedinthede nitionofincome,the
experienceofSwedenlookssimilartothatoftheUSandtheUK(Roineand
Walderstrom    ).
 eincreaseintopincomeshasnotbeenacaseof“li ingallboats”withthe
risingtide. IntheUnitedStates,wheremostoftheincomegrowthhasbeen
capturedbythetop percent(Atkinson,Pike yandSaez    ),therehasbeen
li letrickle-downofwealth,leadingcommentatorstonamethisphenomenon
“winner-take-allinequality”(HackerandPierson    ,Ayres    ). Inequality
hasalsobeenincreasingwithinU.S.states(McNicholetal.     ),andwhile
adjustingforpost-transferincomesandhouseholdsizeamelioratesthesizeofthe
changes,incomeinequalityhasstillincreasedevena ertheseadjustments
(Burkhauser    ),ashasconsumptioninequality(A anasio    ,    ).
Finally,increasinginequalityintheUnitedStateshasnotbeenoﬀsetbyincreases
insocialmobility(BradburyandKatz    ).
Today,theUnitedStatesisoneofthemostunequalrich-andmiddle-income





developedcountries,asithassincethe    ’sintheUnitedStates,andthisfact
givesincreasedurgencytoresearchquestionsaimedatunderstandingpublic
reactionsto,andhabituationwith,thesenewlevelsofincomeinequality.
   .  C         :                                     























I                ,thepoorandthemiddleclasstendtobemoreinfavorof
redistributionthantherich,buttherealsotendstobesubstantialagreement























   echapterstartswithanoverviewofcomparativeresearchona itudes
towardredistribution,followedbyAmericana itudestowardredistributionand
thencomparativeresearchona itudestowardincomeinequalities. Inthe rst
twosections,redistributivepreferenceswillbetreatedasastraight-forward
extensionofeconomicself-interestandasasubsetofthebroadercategory

















howmuchinequalityistoomuch(ortooli le)formed?  ecomparative














 .  A                                               -














(MeltzerandRichard    ). Cross-nationally,therearepersistentclass-based
votingcleavages(Brooksetal.     )andredistributivepreferences









of)redistribution(KellyandEnns    ,Milanovic    ,Finseraas    ,
KenworthyandMcCall    ).
Empiricalsupportforthela er,over-timehypothesisismixed. Onthe
con rmatoryside,Milanovic(    )analyzesredistributivepreferencesin
developedcountriesand ndsthatthemedianvoterisresponsivetoinequalityin
  theexpecteddirection(higherinequalitycorrelateswithmoresupportfor
redistribution). Dallinger(    )also ndsthatinequalityincreasesdemandfor
redistribution,butonlywhenGDPisheldconstant,andFinseraas(    )
performsamulti-levelhierarchicalanalysiswithcross-nationaldata,also nding
apositiverelationshipbetweeninequalityandthemedianvoter’ssupportfor
redistribution. However,KenworthyandMcCall(    ) ndnorelationship
betweeninequalityandsupportforredistributionacrosseightindustrialized
countriesanda  yearperiod. AlesinaandGlaeser(    )arguethatina
comparisonofwealthycountries,moreunequalcountriestendtoexhibitless
demandforredistribution. Turningtoover-timeanalyses,KellyandEnns(    )
arguethatintheUS,increasinginequalityhasdecreasedsupportfor
redistribution,andGeorgiadisandManning(    ) ndasimilarpa erninthe


















(IversenandSoskice    ),elitediscourse(WegnerandPellicer    ),theskew
oftheincomedistribution(LupuandPontusson    ),racialheterogeneity
(AlesinaandGlaeser    ,Gilens    ),unionizationrates(Ruedaand
Pontusson    ),culture(Lu merandSinghal    ),welfareregimetype
(Svallfors    ),religiosity(ScheveandStasavage    ),(perceptionsof)the
possibilityofupwardmobility(BenabouandOk    ,BenabouandTirole
    ,Pike y    ,McCall    ,Lu    )andtrustingovernmentcapability









  withtheformationofredistributivedemands. Forexample,society-level
variationsinperceptionsoftheroleofluckvs. hardworkhavebeenhypothesized
toaﬀectdiﬀerencesinredistributiveequilibriabetweentheUnitedStatesand
Europeancountries(AlesinaandAngeletos    ). GeorgiadisandManning














 .  A                                            -
            
ItispopulartopaintapictureofAmericansasuniquelyacceptingofeconomic
inequalitiesandopposedtoincomeredistribution.  iscomparisonunderlies
  theapproachofAlesinaandGlaeser(    )andisechoedbyJacobsandSkocpol





(OsbergandSmeeding    ). WhilestudiesofAmericana itudestoward
inequalityhavereachedvariousconclusions,thereisatleastsomebroad
agreementthatAmericans’a itudestowardinequalityandredistributionare




withincreasesindefactoinequalitysincethe    ’s(McCall    ).
SinceAmericana itudestowardeconomicinequalityandgovernment
redistributionaremixed,Americanshavebeendescribedas“ambivalent
egalitarians”(Schlozmanetal.     ,Ch.  ),orelse“conservativeegalitarians”
(PageandJacobs,    ). ItwaswithrespecttoAmericanopinionabout




¹JacobsandSkocpol(    ,p. ).
²Bartels(    ,p.   ).
  (    ,p.  -  ) ndthat   ofAmericans,includingamajorityofRepublicans,
agreethat“diﬀerencesinincomeinAmericaaretoolarge”,and   rejectthe
notionthatthecurrentdistributionofmoneyis“fair”;thispa ernhasbeen
evidentsincethemid-    ’s. PoorAmericansaremorelikelytovotefor
le -wingpartiesandtovotebasedoneconomicissues(Bartels    ,Gelmanet
al.     ),andmostAmericanswouldpreferthewealthdistributiontobemore










wealth. AccordingtoKluegelandSmith(    ),amajority(   )ofAmericans
endorse“aboutthepresentlevelofincomeinequality”³whilePageandJacobs




³KluegelandSmith(    ,pp.   - ).
⁴PageandJacobs(    ,p.  ).
  comparativediﬀerencesina itudes. Forexample,racialheterogeneitycombined
withthe(perceptionof)theminoritygroupbeingdisproportionatelypoorcan
reducesupportforredistribution(AlesinaandGlaeser    ,Gilens    ).
Variablessuchaselectoralinstitutions(IversenandSoskice    )andreligiosity







andAriely(    )directlyshowthatAmericansunderestimatewealthinequality
evenastheybelievethereistoomuchofit. Bartels(    ,Ch. )arguesthat
whileAmericanssurveyrespondentssaythattheybelieveinequalityhasrisenin
thelast  years,thisapparentknowledgere ectsfolkwisdomratherthan
genuineawareness. SurveydatausedinChapters and ofthisdissertationalso
con rmsthatmostAmericansunderestimateoccupationalincomeinequality.
However,thereissomeamountofsignalhiddeninthenoiseoffolkwisdom. Xu
andGarand(    ) ndthatpeoplewhoresideinmoreunequalUSstatesare
morelikelytoperceivelargeincreasesinincomeinequalityoverthelast  years,
andthosefromlowerincomestrataaremorelikelytotranslatestateincome
inequalityintoinequalityperceptions. McCall(    )showsthatin    ,
Americans’estimatesoftheamountofmoneyearnedbyCEO’sincreasedsharply
  ascomparedto    ,indicatingsomeawarenessofincreasingtopincomes. Itis
unclearwhetherthisrisemakesupforthecomparativelackofaccurate
















toeconomicinequality. Lane(    )emphasizestheimportanceofbeliefsin
opportunityandtheaccompanyingperceptionofeconomicdiﬀerencesas
deservedinthepoliticalthoughtofworkingclassAmericans. Hochschild(    )
arguesthatforAmericans,thenotionofearned-andthereforedeserved-
diﬀerencesineconomicrewardsmakenotionsofeconomicinequalitymore
  acceptablethannotionsofsocialand/orpoliticalinequality.  ethemesof
desertarealsousedinlater,quantitativestudiesoninequalitya itudes: both














orderingofoccupationsbysuggestedincome(KelleyandEvans    ).  ebest
predictorforthepreciseincomediﬀerencesthataresuggestedbyrespondentsas
idealistheirperceptionofexistingincomediﬀerences(Gijsberts    ,Kelley
andZagorski    ,Austen    ). Ifweacceptthatperceptionsofwhether
incomeinequalitiesare‘deserved’and‘fair’impactredistributivedemand,then
⁵PageandJacobs(    ,p.  ),KluegelandSmith(    ,p.  ).
  factualinequalityitselfmaya enuateredistributivedemands,providedthatthe
populationtosomedegreeperceivesincomeinequalitiesandtheseperceptions



























systemsandexperiencedrapidincreasesinincomeinequality(Heyns    ).
Gijsberts(    )looksatideallevelsofincomeinequalitybetween    -    
and ndsthatidealincomediﬀerencesincreasedinbothcapitalistand
post-communistcountries,buttheincreasewasparticularlymarkedin
post-communisteconomies. KelleyandZagorski(    )also ndthat
transitionsfromcommunismtocapitalismresultinhigherideallevelsofincome
inequality.  esepa ernsofchangingpreferencesarenotwellexplainedby
demographicvariablesineithercommunist/post-communistorcapitalist
countries,⁷butareverywellpredictedby(alsoincreasing)perceptionsofincome
inequality(Gijsberts    ,Austen    ,KelleyandZagorski    ). Kelleyand
Zagorski(    )hypothesizethatthenew,higherincomediﬀerencesare
perceivedbythepopulationandacceptedaslegitimatebecausetheyareascribed
⁶See for example Austen     , Gijsberts     , Hadler     , Kelley and Evans     , Kelley
andZagorski    ,KenworthyandMcCall    ,OsbergandSmeeding    ,andVerwiebeand
Wegener    .
⁷Demographic variables do predict variation in occupation-speci c estimates; for example,
high socio-economic status predicts preferring higher pay as ideal for top earners (Kelley and
Evans,    ). However,demographicvariablesdonotpredicttheideallevelofincomeinequal-
ityparticularlywell(analysisinChapter ofthisdissertation).
  tooutcomesofproductivityand/oreﬀort. OsbergandSmeeding(    )
con rmthatthereisastrongcorrelationbetweenthe‘perceived’andthe
‘preferred’measureswhenaGiniindexoperationalizationisusedinsteadofthe
Jasso(    )justiceindexmeasure.
Evenasinequalityidealshaverisenalongsideperceptionsofinequality,itis
unclearhowthesechangesrelatetopopular(dis)approvalofthenewlevelsof
inequalityandtodemandsforredistribution. LovelessandWhite eld(    )
 ndthateventhoughinequalityincreasedinnewCentral-European
democracies,a itudesonwhetherthereistoomuchsocialinequalitywerenot
aﬀectedbyindicesofactualinequality. InEstoniabetween    and    ,for
example,agreementwiththestatement“incomediﬀerencesaretoolarge”didnot
changedespiteincreasingincomeinequality(Saar    ). Itdoesappearthatthe
gapbetweenidealandperceivedlevelsofinequalitywidenedduringthisperiod
(VerwiebeandWegener    ,Jasso    ),andinoverallpreferences,
post-Communistcountriesremainedmoreegalitarianthancapitalistcountries




experience,includinganalysesoftheUnitedStates(OsbergandSmeeding    ,
Svallfors    ). Incomparativeperspective,Americansdonotstandoutas
preferringexceptionallyhighlevelsofinequality,buttheyarealsoparticularly
likelytounderestimatethelevelofCEOpayintheircountry(Osbergand
  Smeeding    ).⁸ SubjectiveperceptionsofinequalityintheUnitedStatesare
thereforesomewhatbelowtheaverageofallcountries,andinpreferred











ListhaugandAalberg(    )suggestthe“adjustmenthypothesis”that






⁸McCall (    ) shows that in     , when these questions were asked in the United States
as part of the General Social Survey, perceptions of CEO pay had increased markedly from the
previous survey wave in     ; it is unclear whether this increase has kept pace with the actual





 .  C         
 ereisanelegantandstraight-forwardtheoreticalreasontoexpectindividuals
tosupportredistribution: weexpecthumanbeingstoactaccordingtotheir





































economicsystems(KelleyandEvans    ,Marshalletal.     ). Beyondthe
initialagreementthatsomelevelofinequalityisdesirable,therearesigni cant
cross-nationalandindividual-leveldiﬀerencesinreportedideallevelsofincome
inequality(OsbergandSmeeding,    ).  israisesthequestion: howdo
individualsmovefromtheabstractnotionofdeserttoanevaluationofthe




(VerbaandOrren    ,KelleyandEvans    ),buthowmanytimesmore? If
wesuspectthat,astheliteratureontheimportanceof‘desert’perceptionsinthe

































(    )showthatdescribingonesetofchoices(forexample,achoicebetween
investmentportfolios)asthestatusquomakesindividualsmorelikelytoselect
thealternativethatisdescribedasthestatusquo.  emereexposureeﬀect




eﬀectservestoenhancestatusquobias. Primacyeﬀects(Asch    ,Anderson
¹EidelmanandCrandall(    ,Ch. ,p.  ).  ischapterprovidesanoverviewofthevarious
mechanismsatworkinproducingstatusquobias;theinformationinthisparagraphandthenext
isbasedontheirsummary.




andTversky    )canbethoughtofasanotherpotentialsourceofstatusquo
bias,asitincreasesindividuals’probability,underspeci ccircumstances,of
choosingthesafestatusquooverariskieralternative. Finally,theanchoring
eﬀect(TverskyandKahneman    )contributestostatusquobias. Duetothe
anchoringeﬀect,whichisparticularlyprominentinunit-basedestimation,
“peopleinsuﬃcientlyadjustfromthatwhichismentallyaccessible.”² Anexample












²EidelmanandCrandall(    ,p.  ).













































⁴LernerandMiller(    ,p.    ).





















⁵Jostetal. (    ,p.   ).
⁶LiviatanandJost(    ,p.   ).
  fromthedesiretoperceivethatonehascontroloverone’senvironment.”⁷ Belief
inajustworldservesamotivatingfunction: theabilitytoself-regulateinthe
pursuitoflong-termgoalsdependsonthebeliefthatone’ssocialenvironmentis









redistribution.”⁸ JostandHunyady(    )directlysuggestthatoneconsequence
ofsystemjusti cationisthata)peoplerationalizethestatusquoandb)inthe
processofdoingso,theyinternalize(cometoaccept)inequalitiesevenwhen







⁷JostandHunyady(    ,p.   ).
⁸Jostetal. (    ,p.   ).
  socialsystemisfair.  istrade-oﬀ,andtheeasewithwhichconceptsof‘desert’
canbeadjusted,liesbehindtheexpectationthatthestatusquoofinformation
diﬀerenceschangesinequalityideals.




































individualtendenciestojustifythesocialsystem(JostandHunyady,    ).
Peoplewithhighbeliefinajustworld“seetheexistingsituationasmorefair
becausetargetsareseenassimplyge ingwhattheydeserve.”¹⁰  eindividual
⁹LernerandMiller(    ,p.    ).
¹⁰HaferandChoma(    ,p.   )
  tendencytobelieveinajustworldpredictsperceptionsofthefairnessofsocietal
phenomena,suchasthedistributionofwealthandtheoccurrenceof
discriminationagainstraceorgendergroups(HaferandChoma,    ,Lipkus

















¹¹LiviatanandJost(    ,p.   ).

















treatmentreferstotheparticipants’owncountry. vanderToornetal(    )
showthatactivatingthesystemjusti cationmotivebymanipulatingperceptions
oftheindividual’sdependenceonthesocialsystemincreasespatriotismscores




































I           thatasksrespondentsfortheirperceptionsofincome
diﬀerences,theseperceptionsarethestrongestpredictoroftherespondents’
  idealincomediﬀerences. Inthischapter,Ireplicatethispreviouslydiscussed
 ndingandshowthatthispredictivepa ernholdsacrosscountriesandwhen



















CologneGermanyZA    ,DataVersion . . (    -  -  ).





researchwaspublishedintheearlytomid-    ’sandusedthe    and    
wavesoftheISSP. eSocialInequalitymodulewasmostrecently eldedagain
in    in  countries,²andthisisthedatathatIwillbeusingbelow. Sincethe
UnitedStatesdidnot eldthismoduleoftheISSPin    ,butdid elditaspart
ofthe    GeneralSocialSurvey(GSS),³Iwillbeusing    dataforthe
UnitedStates,bringingthetotalnumberofcountriesto  . Iwillbuildon
previousresearch,con rmthatthepredictiverelationshipbetweenperceptions




² eSocialInequalityModuleofthe    ISSPwavewasimplementedin: Argentina,Aus-
tralia, Austria,Belgium, Bulgaria, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Esto-
nia, Finland, France, Great Britain, Hungary, Israel, Japan, Latvia, New Zealand, Norway, the
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden,
SwitzerlandandUkraine.
³Smith,TomW,PeterMarsden,MichaelHout,andJibumKim. Generalsocialsurveys,    -
    . Accessibleat: h p://www .norc.org/gss+website/.




















⁴ e latest wave of the Social Inequality module includes additional occupations, such as
“serviceworker”. Ihavechosentousethe recurringoccupationsheretomaintain,ascloselyas
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  Table 5.1: Country-speciﬁc regressions predicting respondents’ ideal
levels of inequality.
Independent variable: index of preferences for inequality, calculated as
ln(highest suggested income/lowest suggested income). Coeﬃcients in bold
are signiﬁcant at the 95% level. Additional control variables (not shown):
Vote (left), Education , Gender, Age, Age , Marital status. The coeﬃcients
for income are based on national currencies (in units of 1,000) and are there-
fore not directly comparable.
*United States estimates are based on data from the 2010 General Social Sur-
vey; due to the structure of the questionnaire, the operationalization of some
covariates diﬀers from the other regressions. In particular, the US education
variable indicates a college degree, not years of education.
Perceived inequality Income Vote (right) Education (years)
Country Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E. N Adj. R2
Argentina 0.37 0.04 1.90 1.35 0.22 0.29 -0.004 0.004 474 0.19
Australia 0.46 0.02 3.13 <0.001 0.15 0.07 0.07 0.04 1073 0.36
Austria 0.47 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.02 0..11 637 0.43
Belgium 0.53 0.02 5.65 0.01 -0.02 0.05 -0.09 -0.03 783 0.46
Bulgaria 0.46 0.06 0.03 0.03 -0.07 0.10 0.03 0.05 227 0.21
Chile 0.69 0.02 0.0001 <0.001 0.09 0.06 -0.06 0.03 966 0.49
Croatia 0.38 0.03 0.01 <0.001 0.11 0.05 -0.005 0.02 668 0.18
Cyprus 0.72 0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01 819 0.50
Czech Republic 0.43 0.03 0.004 0.001 0.17 0.06 0.05 0.04 742 0.25
Denmark 0.53 0.02 0.0002 <0.001 0.06 0.05 -0.005 0.02 1052 0.37
Estonia 0.42 0.03 0.003 0.002 -0.06 0.16 0.03 0.03 706 0.19
Finland 0.50 0.03 0.02 0.006 0.13 0.06 0.04 0.02 556 0.37
France 0.45 0.015 0.08 0.01 0.19 0.05 0.008 0.01 1914 0.40
Great Britain 0.48 0.03 0.006 0.002 0.32 0.08 0.05 0.04 678 0.34
Hungary 0.43 0.04 0.001 <0.001 0.14 0.06 0.06 0.06 552 0.21
Israel 0.39 0.04 0.007 0.005 -0.12 0.06 0.01 0.03 581 0.18
Japan 0.68 0.04 0.0001 <0.001 0.04 0.09 0.22 0.14 363 0.47
Latvia 0.25 0.04 0.30 0.08 0.25 0.13 -0.03 0.05 517 0.14
New Zealand 0.51 0.03 0.002 <0.001 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.04 773 0.35
Norway 0.37 0.02 <0.001 <0.001 0.10 0.05 -0.02 0.03 1191 0.23
Philippines 0.65 0.02 -0.007 0.015 -0.06 0.08 -0.06 0.03 867 0.51
Poland 0.41 0.03 0.04 0.01 -0.04 0.07 0.06 0.08 634 0.29
Portugal 0.33 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.10 -0.02 0.02 334 0.20
Slovakia 0.42 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.006 0.07 -0.05 0.06 825 0.25
South Africa 0.47 0.02 -0.001 -0.003 0.13 0.09 -0.01 0.02 1839 0.28
South Korea 0.57 0.02 0.18 0.10 0.13 0.08 -0.004 0.05 1293 0.47
Spain 0.34 0.04 0.07 0.05 -0.05 0.09 0.02 0.01 439 0.19
Sweden 0.36 0.02 0.004 <0.001 0.14 0.05 -0.03 0.02 891 0.36
Switzerland 0.33 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.05 646 0.38
Ukraine 0.25 0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.21 -0.07 0.08 523 0.08
United States* 0.51 0.04 0.01 0.001 0.26 0.12 -0.12 0.08 774 0.27
Regression results. Independent variable: index of preferences for inequality, calculated as
ln(highest suggested income/lowest suggested income)
Coe cients in bold are signiﬁcant at the 95% level. Additional control variables (not shown):
Vote (left), Education2, Gender, Age, Age2, Marital status.
The coe cients for income are based on national currencies (in units of 1,000) and are therefore
not directly comparable.
*United States estimates are based on data from the 2010 General Social Survey; due to the
structure of the questionnaire, the operationalization of some covariates di↵ers from the remaining
regressions. In particular, the US education variable indicates a college degree, not years of
education.
1
  perceptions(seeTable . ). Individualincomepredictspreferencesfor
inequalityin  outof  countries;thisrelationshipisalwaysintheexpected
directionwherebythosewhoearnmorealsothinkthatlargerincomediﬀerences
aredesirable.⁵ Self-reportedvoteforaright-wingpartyinthelastparliamentary





analysesofsimilardata(Austen    ,Gijsberts    ,OsbergandSmeeding










McCall(    ),forexample, ndnorelationshipbetweenrealandperceived
inequalityineightcapitalist,liberaldemocraticcountriesduringthe    ’sand
⁵Note that the income coeﬃcients are based on units of domestic currency (in the respon-
dent’sself-reportedannualincome)andarethereforenotcomparableacrosscountries.
      ’s. Asdiscussedabove,whileAmericanperceptionsofinequalityincludea
fairamountoffolkwisdom(Bartels    ),therealsoseemstobesomesignalin







pa erns.  ecountry-levelmedianperceptionsofinequalityarecorrelatedat











⁶Gini coeﬃcient estimates from: Solt, Frederick.     . “Standardizing the World Income
Inequality Database.” Social Science Quarterly   ( ):   -   . SWIID Version  . , December
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coeﬃcientsfromthe rstcolumnofTable . ),orderedbycoeﬃcientmagnitude.
 evariationincoeﬃcientsissubstantive,fromalowof .  inUkraineand














fractionalization(seeGilens    orRoemeretal.     ),ortounionization
rates(RuedaandPontusson    ).
Figures . - . showtherelationshipbetweenperceptionsandideals,plo ed
againstincomeinequality(Figure . ),ethnicfractionalization(Figure . )and




relationshiparestatisticallysigni cant.  eextenttowhichperceivedinequalities
areaccepted(or,equivalently,rejected)doesnotappeartobesystematically
relatedtounionizationrates,theGiniindexofdisposableincome,orethnic
  l l
l l l
l l l l l
l l l l l l
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Figure 5.1: Country-speciﬁc coeﬃcients for the predictive relationship
between inequality perceptions and inequality ideals, ordered by size.
The coeﬃcients are taken from Table 5.1 and are shown with 95% conﬁdence
intervals.





 .  C         
Perceptionsofincomeinequalityareastrongpredictorofidealincomeinequality




































































































































Figure 5.2: Coeﬃcients for the relationship between inequality percep-
tions and ideals, by income inequality.
Plot of coeﬃcients by the Gini coeﬃcient of disposable income. The regres-
sion line is ﬁtted from a bootstrapped regression predicting the strength of
the perception-ideal relationship; it is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. See




































































































Figure 5.3: Coeﬃcients for the relationship between inequality percep-
tions and ideals, by ethnic fractionalization.
Plot of coeﬃcients by ethnic fractionalization at the national level. The re-
gression line is ﬁtted from a bootstrapped regression predicting the strength of
the perception-ideal relationship; it is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. See
text for data sources. The coeﬃcients are taken from Table 5.1.































































































Figure 5.4: Coeﬃcients for the relationship between inequality percep-
tions and ideals, by unionization rate.
Plot of coeﬃcients by unionization rate at the national level. The regression
line is ﬁtted from a bootstrapped regression predicting the strength of the
perception-ideal relationship; it is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. See
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 e rstexperimentaltestofthehabituationhypothesiswasdesignedasatestof
principle.  eaimofthisexperimentistoshowthatexperiencingaspeci clevel
ofinequalityin uencesoursubsequentestimatesoftheappropriatelevelof








andEnglish    ),andthatperceptionsofdesert gureprominentlyinfairness











 . .  M     
  participantswererecruitedusingtheHarvardPsychologyDepartmentStudy








ina -minuteanagramsolvingcompetition.  ecompetitionintroducedthe
randomlyassignedtreatmentcondition: anextramonetaryprize,tobe
distributedbetweenthewinnerandtheloserofthechallenge. Inthe‘unequal’
condition,thewinnerwastoget  andtheloserwastoget  . Inthe‘equal’








diﬃcult. A ertheanagramtask,participants lledinasecondba eryofBigFive
questionswhiletheresearcherscoredthetask.  eparticipantsscoredbetween 




winner’saward.  eythen lledinthe nalquestionnaireoftheexperiment
¹Except in the case of very low participant scores,  -  points, in which case the confederate
‘scored’ pointmorethantheparticipant.
  whichwasostensiblyabouttheirexperienceofthecompetition. Includedonthe
 nalquestionnairewasaquestiononthefairnessofthepaymentreceivedbythe
participant,andaquestiononhowtheparticipantherselfwoulddistributethe





 e  participantscompletedthestudyforacashpaymentof  (  
participants)orcoursecredit(  participants)plusthecashpaymentearned




doesnotchangetheresultsoftheexperiment.  eremaining  participants
wereacombinationofcollegestudentsandcommunitymembers. Agesranged
from  to  (mean  ,median  ).   werefemaleand  male.    of
participantswereWhite,   wereAfricanAmerican,   wereHispanic,   
wereAsianand participantsreported‘Other’.   participantswereinthe
‘unequal’condition(  -  )and  inthe‘equal’condition(  -  ).





divideexactly   betweenthewinnerandloser.  eresultsareshowninFigure
 . : participantsinthe‘equal’conditionwould,onaverage,givethewinner
  .  ,whileparticipantsinthe‘unequal’conditionwould,onaverage,givethe
winner  .  .  ediﬀerenceissigni cantatp< .   . Individualsinthe  
conditionreportwithasigni cantly(p= .  )higherprobabilitythattheir
paymentwasnotfair,andtheaveragedollaramountallocatedtothewinneris











  $6 condition $9 condition





























Figure 6.1: Laboratory experiment results: money allocation to the
winner by inequality condition.
Showing the amount of money (out of $10) that participants allocated to the
winner of an anagram competition, by experimental condition. In the $6 con-
dition, the winner received $6 and in the unequal condition, the winner re-
ceived $9. The diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at p <0.001.
  opinionregardingappropriatelevelsofinequalityinthecompetitionwas
in uencedbytheinequalitytheyhadjustexperienced.













prizemoney.  isisindeedwhatweseeinFigure . ,wheretheexperimental
resultsarebrokendownintogroupsofrespondentswhowerebelow/abovethe
medianscoreonthebeliefinjustworldscale.² AscanbeseeninFigure . ,high
BJWrespondentsrecommendmoreunequaldistributionsofmoneyinboth
conditions. Controllingforexperimentalcondition,thosehighinBJWwould
² eBJWscalerangesfrom to ,wherehigherscoresindicatehigherbeliefsthattheworld
isjust. Inmysample,theresponsesrangedfrom .  to .  ,withameanof .  andmedianof
 .  .
  $6 condition $9 condition









Low Belief in Just World






















Figure 6.2: Laboratory experiment results: money allocation to the
winner by inequality and belief in just world.
Showing the amount of money (out of $10) that participants allocated to the
winner of an anagram competition, by experimental condition and the respon-
dent’s score on the Belief in Just World scale. In the $6 condition, the winner
received $6 and in the unequal condition, the winner received $9.





















³ ere were too few ( ) self-reported Republicans in my sample to allow a test with parti-
sanship.
  peoplethinkofasituationasunfair,andwanttodiminishtheunfairnessofit(in
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highincomeinequality.  especi cformofthehabituationhypothesisinthis
experimentis:
  Hypothesis: participantswhoarerandomlyassignedto ndoutthattheir
societyismoreunequalthanpreviouslybelievedwillincreasetheirestimatesof
howmuchincomeinequalityisdesirable.






























thetrueextentofincomeinequality.  is ndingisreplicatedinthesurvey
sampleusedforthisexperiment: about   ofrespondentsguessthatthetrue
ratioofhighesttolowestincomesislowerthanitreallyis. Basedonthe    
ratiooftheincomesofunskilledfactoryworkerstotheincomesofCEO’sof
StandardandPoor’s   companies,thetruehigh-to-lowincomeratioisslightly






   . .  M     
   U.S.participantswererecruitedonAmazon’sMechanicalTurk⁴inAugust
    toansweran“Opinionsurvey”.  emeanageofparticipantswas  ,   
werefemale,   hadacollegedegreeorhigher,   wereCaucasian,and   
self-identi edasRepublican.  eparticipantsansweredsomebasicdemographic
questionsandthescaleonbeliefinajustworld(Lipkus    ),followedby
questionsregardingperceivedandidealincomeinequality. Half(   )ofthe
participantswereinthecontrolgroupandreceivednofactualinformationabout
inequality;half(   participants)receivedinformationregardingthecurrent






⁴SeeBerinskyetal(    )forasummaryontheuseofAmazon’sMechanicalTurkasaplat-
formforsocialscienceexperiments.
⁵All information is factually correct.  e pay numbers for doctor in general prac-
tice, owner of a small shop, skilled factory worker, and unskilled factory worker come
from the May      National Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates United States
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (accessed Jan         at http://www.bls.gov/
oes/current/oes_nat.htm).  e information for members of the federal cabinet
comes from payscale.com (accessed at http://jobs.aol.com/articles/    /  /  /
federal-government-pay-scale/onJan      ).  einformationforCEOoflargena-
tional company comes from the AFL-CIO’s analysis of Standard and Poor     companies in
     (accessed at the Executive Paywatch section of http://www.afl-cio.org on Jan   
    ).
  Occupation
Chairman of a large national corporation
Member of the cabinet in the federal government
Doctor in general practice
Owner of small shop
Skilled factory worker
Unskilled factory worker
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics, AFL-CIO, 
Payscale.com







Figure 6.3: Information treatment in survey experiment.
The information manipulation was administered to a randomly selected half of
respondents. All information is factually correct (see footnote 5, this chapter,
for data sources).
responsibilityofthegovernmenttoreduceincomediﬀerences.⁶
 . .  R      
 eresultsofthesurveyexperimentaresummarizedinFigure . . Inthe
absenceofinformationaboutinequality,respondentsthoughtthatthebestpaid
occupationshouldearn timesmorethantheleastwellpaidoccupation.  isis
reasonablyclosetothenationalaveragepreferenceof  timesmore,basedon
similarquestionsaskedinthe    GSS.GiventhattheMechanicalTurksample
ismoreliberalthanthenationalaverage,thepreferenceforsomewhatlower
incomeinequalityissomethingwemightexpect.
⁶ esixpoliticala itudequestionswere: ‘Howo endoyoutrustthegovernmentinWash-
ingtontodowhatisright?’,‘DiﬀerencesinincomeinAmericaaretoolarge.’,‘Largediﬀerencesin
income are necessary for America’s prosperity.’, ‘It is the responsibility of the government to re-
ducethediﬀerencesinincomebetweenpeoplewithhighincomesandpeoplewithlowincomes.’,
‘ erichpaytoomuchintaxes.’ and‘ egovernmenthasaresponsibilitytohelpthepoor.’
  No information Information provided























Figure 6.4: Survey experiment results: recommended inequality by in-
formation condition.
Showing the recommended ratio of highest to lowest salaries, by information
treatment group. The diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at p <0.001.
  Table 6.1: Survey experiment results: regression coeﬃcients predicting
inequality ideals.
Showing regression coeﬃcients from a linear least squares model; outcome
variable is the index of preferred income inequality, calculated as ln(highest
speciﬁed income/lowest speciﬁed income). The coeﬃcients in bold are sig-
niﬁcant at the 95% level. The information treatment variable is a dummy
variable. Belief in a just world is a dummy variable indicating above median
scores on the belief in just world scale. Democrat is a dummy variable for self-
identifying as a Democrat, or as an independent who leans Democratic.
Model  Model  Model 
Variable Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E.
Intercept  .    .    .    .    .    .  
Informationtreatment  .    .    .    .    .    .  
Beliefinjustworld  .    .  
Democrat - .    .  
N            
Adj. R   .    .    .  
A erexposuretoinformationregardingtrueincomediﬀerences,thepreferred
incomeratiorisesto  . -amorethan   increasefromcontrolgroup





onlytwooutof   respondentsinthetreatmentgrouprecommendadivision
thatisasormoreunequalthanthestatusquothathasjustbeendescribedto
⁷In this experiment, the eﬀect is driven by adjustments made to preferences for CEO pay.
However, basing estimates for fair pay on information regarding actual pay is not limited to ex-
ceptionally high incomes: a similar adjustment eﬀect, but with respect to the recommended
amountofstateaidtofamiliesbelowthepovertyline,isdemonstratedinIyengar(    ).
  them. Mostrespondentsstartfromapositionofbelievingthereismore
inequalitythantheythinkisideal,andtheystillthinkthatinequalityishigher




















  No information Information provided
Total
Low Belief in Just World
High Belief in Just World

























Figure 6.5: Survey experiment results: recommended inequality by in-
formation condition and belief in just world.
Showing the recommended ratio of highest to lowest salaries, by treatment
group and belief in a just world score (respondents divided at the median
score). Values shown are predicted from Model 2 in Table 6.1.





























Figure 6.6: Survey experiment results: recommended inequality by in-
formation condition and partisanship.
Showing the recommended ratio of highest to lowest salaries, by treatment

















bypartyidenti cation.  eresultsofthisdivisionareshowninModel inTable
 . andinFigure . . Becausebeliefinjustworldisknowntocorrelatewith




andinequalitypreferences.  isrelationshipisindeedwhatwe nd: inthe
informationaswellasthecontrolcondition,Democratsprefersigni cantlyless
  inequalitythanRepublicans.  einformationtreatmentmovesbothgroupsup;
theadjustmentisequivalenttomultiplyingtheoriginalestimateofidealincome
diﬀerencesby .  .  isadjustmentisroughlythesamesizeasthediﬀerence
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informationtreatmentgroup. Figure . presentstheresultsforthequestion
regardinggovernmentresponsibilitytoreduceincomediﬀerences,whichhadthe




































































Figure 6.7: Survey experiment results: support for redistribution by
partisanship and experimental condition.
Showing agreement (on a 1-5 scale) with the statement that “It is the respon-
sibility of the government to reduce the income diﬀerences in income between
people with high incomes and people with low incomes.”
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Changingthelandscape: societyand
ﬆatusquoacceptance.
I                           foridealinequalityaresubjecttothe
habituationeﬀect. InthecurrenteconomicsituationoftheUnitedStates,where




















    .  M         :                                    
      
Itisknownthatthestrengthofthesystemjusti cationmotivationnotonlyvaries
acrossindividuals,butalsohassituationaldeterminants. JostandHunyady

















¹JostandHunyadyn(    ,p.   )
²KayandFriesen(    ,p.   )
   theiroutcomes,theyincreasetheextenttowhichtheyjustifythesystemand
thinkofthesystemasfair.
 esesituationaldeterminantsofthemotivationtojustifythesocialsystem
canbeexperimentallymanipulated(seeKayetal.     foranoverviewof
experimentsinthisframework).  eexperimentalmanipulationsusedinthis
literaturearedesignedtotemporarilyincreasethesystemjusti cationmotivation
















³ at political conservatism is associated with a higher tendency to engage is system justi -
cationhasbeensuggestedbyJostetal. (    )andNapierandJost(    ).
    .  S          :                                     -









































life,”saysDr. Johnson. Finally,a    Pewsurveysuggeststhat
manyolderAmericansnowseehowtheirliveswere[un]aﬀectedby
changesingovernment. “Lookingback,Iseehowmyqualityoflife







thiscase,theUnitedStates).  ismanipulationwasusedbyKayetal. (    )to
increasethetreatedparticipants’agreementwiththenotionthattheCanadian
HouseofRepresentativesshouldbecomposedlargelyofwealthypeople(the













    estudywassetuptoreplicatethesurveyexperimentpresentedinchapter ,
withtheadditionofarandomlyassignedparagraph,presentedasa“reading
comprehensiontask”.  eparagraphwasplacedinthesurveybeforethe rst
questionaboutincomeinequality.
   participantswererecruitedAmazon’sMechanicalTurkinJanuary    to
answeran“Opinionsurvey”.  emeanageofrespondentswas  years,witha
medianof  andarangefrom  to  .    werefemale,   hadacollege
degree,and   identi edasDemocrats(includingindependentswholean
Democratic).    self-identi edasCaucasian,  asAsianand  asAfrican
American. OnthebeliefinjustworldScale,whichrangesfrom - ,themean
responsewas .  andthemedianresponsewas .  . Intheanalysesbelow,
respondentsweresplitinto“high”and“low”beliefinjustworldgroupsbasedon
whethertheywereaboveorbelowthemedianscore.
 .  R      :                                         -




high-beliefinjustworldindividualsstatisticallyinsigni cant.  eresultsare
presentedindetailTable . andFigure . .
AsTable . shows,thetwotreatmentparagraphshadsimilareﬀects: both
   Table 7.1: Survey experiment results: impact of system justiﬁcation
manipulations on inequality preferences.
Showing regression coeﬃcients from a linear least squares model; outcome
variable is the index of preferred income inequality, calculated as ln(highest
speciﬁed income / lowest speciﬁed income). The coeﬃcients in bold are sig-
niﬁcant at the 95% level. In Model 3, the dependency and inescapability
treatments are collapsed to increase power. The information treatment vari-
able is a dummy variable. Belief in a just world is a dummy variable indicating
above median scores on the belief in just world scale.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Variable Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E.
Intercept 1.91 0.13 2.03 0.15 1.96 0.10 2.06 0.09
Information treatment 0.81 0.13 0.47 0.12 0.64 0.09 0.61 0.09
Belief in just world (BJW) 0.46 0.18 0.38 0.17 0.42 0.12
Republican identiﬁcation 0.55 0.15
High dependency 0.18 0.18
High dependency x BJW -0.13 0.25
High inescapability 0.32 0.18
High inescapability x BJW -0.34 0.24
Inescapability or dependency 0.25 0.13 0.20 0.11
Inescapability or dependency x BJW -0.23 0.18 -0.31 0.21
N 399 394 793 666
Adj. R2 0.11 0.04 0.08 0.08
3












Low Belief in Just World
High Belief in Just World













Control Information Control Information
Neutral replication System threat
Figure 7.1: Survey experiment results by belief in just world and system
justiﬁcation manipulation.
Showing the recommended ratio of highest to lowest salaries. Values shown
are predicted from Model 3 in Table 7.1. The “system threat” condition indi-
cates receipt of either a system dependency or a system inescapability treat-
ment.
   increasethelevelofinequalityrecommendedbylowBJWindividuals,butdonot
aﬀecttheinequalityidealofhighBJWindividuals. Whenthetreatmentsare
analyzedoneatatime,thesystemdependencymanipulationexhibitsthe
expectedpa ernofresults,buttheimpactisstatisticallyinsigni cant.  e
inescapabilitytreatmenthasasomewhatstrongereﬀect,andthiseﬀectis
marginallysigni cant(atthep< .  )level. Whenthetwotreatmentsare
combined,thepowerthatisgainedfromcombiningparticipantsreducesthe
standarderrorwithoutchangingtheaveragetreatmenteﬀect,andthecombined
eﬀectisstatisticallysigni cantatthe   level(seeColumn ofTable . ).  is
modelisusedtocalculatethepredictedvaluespresentedinFigure . . Inthe
 gure,receiptofeitherthehighinescapabilityorthehighdependencytreatment





lowandhighBJWindividualsinsigni cant.  esystemjusti cationactivation
condition,onaverage,causesthelowBJWrespondentstorecommendan





   withoutanyinformationonactualinequality. Asshownpreviously,most
respondentsthinkthatthereisahighlevelofinequalityintheU.S;theyjust


















Jostetal. (    )havearguedthattheindividualleveltendencytojustifythe
systemisrelatedtoconservativepoliticalbeliefs. Inmysampleofrespondents,
thereisindeedapositive,althoughnotstriking,correlationbetweenbeliefsin
   justworldandrepublicanidenti cation( .  ). However,thepossibilitythatthe
‘systemthreat’manipulationmaycausethepoliticallandscapetochangeinterms
ofthediﬀerencesbetweenpartisanidenti ersisanintriguingone. Model in




signi cant(p= .  )forDemocratsandhasaninsigni cantimpacton












⁴In the presented results, complete independents are excluded.  e results are similar but
withasomewhatweakerstatisticalsigni canceifindependentsareincluded.





























Control Information Control Information
Neutral replication System threat
Figure 7.2: Survey experiment results by partisanship and system justi-
ﬁcation manipulation.
Showing the recommended ratio of highest to lowest salaries. Values shown
are predicted from Model 4 in Table 7.1. The “system threat” condition indi-
cates receipt of either a system dependency or a system inescapability treat-
ment.























   howdoperceptionsofseriousthreatssuchastheColdWarorterrorism
in uencethedynamicsofpublicopinionondomesticissueslikeincome
inequality?  isiswherepoliticalscienceresearchmeetsthecurrent‘edge’of
socialpsychologyresearchonsystemjusti cation.  elong-termsocial
determinantsofthesalienceofthesystemjusti cationmotivearenotyetwell

















⁵PersonalcommunicationswithJaimeNapier,November    .
   system,thesystemjusti cationmotive,anda itudestowardthestatusquo
(includingincomeinequality)isanimportanttaskforfutureresearch.
   8
Discussionandconclusion
H                                           ? Howarethese
a itudesin uencedbythesocietythatsurroundstheindividual? Whyisitthe
casethateverywherewelook,thereislessdemandforredistributionthanwe
mightexpectgivenmaterialself-interestmotivations?  isdissertationhas























   incomeinequalityhasnotproducedincreaseddemandsforredistribution.
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 ehabituationhypothesisspeakstotheempirical ndingthatinunequal













¹EvansandKelley(    ,p.  ).
   publicopinionastheproductofasinglecausaldirection:  ompublicopinionto
realityontheground. Ofcourse,alldemocraticopinionissubjectto
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stronglyabout(seeHochschild    foradiscussionoftheimportanceof
politicalequalitytoAmericans,andhowthiscontrastswitha itudestoward
economicinequality). AsMcCall(    )shows,whileperceptionsoffactual
inequalityhittheirall-timehighin    ,concernabouteconomicinequalitywas





















²Bam eldandHorton(    ,p. ).





























   References
[ ] DaronAcemogluandJamesARobinson. EconomicOriginsofDictatorship
andDemocracy. CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,    .
[ ] AlbertoF.AlesinaandGeorge-MariosAngeletos. Fairnessand
Redistribution: USversusEurope. SSRNElectronicJournal,    . URL
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=      .
[ ] AlbertoFAlesinaandEdwardGlaeser. FightingPovertyintheU.S.and
Europe: AWorldofDiﬀerence. OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,    .
[ ] RobertAndersenandTinaFetner. EconomicInequalityandIntolerance:
A itudestowardHomosexualityin  Democracies. AmericanJournalof
PoliticalScience,  ( ):   –   ,    .
[ ] LisaRAnderson,JenniferMMellor,andJeﬀreyMilyo. Inequalityand
PublicGoodsProvision(WorkingPaper).     .
[ ] N.H.Anderson. Afunctionaltheoryofcognition. LawrenceErlbaum
Associates,Hillsdale,NJ,    .
[ ] SolomonEAsch. Formingimpressionsofpersonality. Journalof
AbnormalandSocialPsychology,  :    –    ,    .
[ ] A.B.Atkinson. IncomeInequalityinOECDCountries: Dataand
Explanations. EconomicStudies,  ( ):   –   ,    .
[ ] AnthonyBAtkinson, omasPike y,andEmmanuelSaez. TopIncomes
intheLongRunofHistory. JournalofEconomicLiterature,  ( ): –  ,
    .
[  ] OrazioA anasio.  eEvolutionofIncome,Consumption,andLeisure
Inequalityin eUS,    -    (WorkingPaper).     .
   [  ] OrazioPA anasio,ErichBa istin,andMarioPadula. Inequalityin
LivingStandardssince    : EvidencefromExpenditureData(Working
Paper).     .
[  ] SiobhanAusten. Aninternationalcomparisonofa itudestoinequality.
InternationalJournalofSocialEconomics,  ( ):   –   ,    . doi:
  .    /                 . URL
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/  .    /                 .
[  ] JeﬀreyAyres. Searchingforthesupposedbene tsofhigherinequality.
AmericanReviewofCanadianStudies,  ( ):   –   ,December    .
doi:   .    /                 .
[  ] LouiseBam eldandTimHorton. Understandinga itudestotackling
economicinequality. Technicalreport,JosephRowntreeFoundation,
London,    .
[  ] BenjaminS.IVBarberandWilliamEnglish. DivideOurDollars,Not
Divide eDollar: Redistribution,Fairness,andtheUltimatumGame
(WorkingPaper).     .
[  ] LarryMBartels. UnequalDemocracy:  ePoliticalEconomyoftheNew
GildedAge. PrincetonUniversityPress,Princeton,    .
[  ] JasonBeck eld. Doesincomeinequalityharmhealth? Newcross-national
evidence. Journalofhealthandsocialbehavior,  ( ):   –  ,September
    . URLhttp://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/        .
[  ] RolandBenabouandEfeA.Ok. Socialmobilityandthedemandfor
redistribution: thepoumhypothesis. QuarterlyJournalofEconomics,
(May):   –   ,    .
[  ] RolandBenabouandJeanTirole. BeliefinaJustWorldandRedistributive
Politics. QuarterlyJournalofEconomics,   ( ):   –   ,May    . doi:
  .    /qjec.    .   . .   . URLhttp://qje.oxfordjournals.
org/lookup/doi/  .    /qjec.    .   . .   .
[  ] AdamJBerinsky,GregoryAHuber,andGabrielSLenz. Using
MechanicalTurkasaSubjectRecruitmentToolforExperimental
Research(WorkingPaper).     .
   [  ] CarlesBoix. DemocracyandRedistribution. CambridgeUniversityPress,
Cambridge,    .
[  ] KatharineBradburyandJaneKatz. Arelifetimeincomesgrowingmore
unequal? Lookingatnewevideceonfamilyincomemobility. Regional
Review,(Q ): – ,    .
[  ] AndreaBrandolini. PoliticalEconomyandtheMechanicsofPolitics.
Politics&Society,  ( ):   –   ,May    . doi:
  .    /                . URL
http://pas.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/  .    /                .
[  ] ClemBrooks,PaulNieuwbeerta,andJeﬀManza. Cleavage-basedvoting
behaviorincross-nationalperspective: evidencefromsixpostwar
democracies. SocialScienceResearch,  ( ):  –   ,March    . doi:
  .    /j.ssresearch.    .  .   . URLhttp://linkinghub.
elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S       X       X.
[  ] RichardVBurkhauser. PresidentialAddress: EvaluatingtheQuestions
 atAlternativePolicySuccessMeasuresAnswer. JournalofPolicy
AnalysisandManagement,  ( ):   –   ,    . doi:   .    /pam     .
[  ] RobertADahl. Polyarchy. YaleUniversityPress,NewHaven,    .
[  ] U.Dallinger. Publicsupportforredistribution: whatexplains
cross-nationaldiﬀerences? JournalofEuropeanSocialPolicy,  ( ):
   –   ,October    . doi:   .    /                . URL
http://esp.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/  .    /                .
[  ] AngusDeatonandDarrenLubotsky. Mortality,inequalityandracein
Americancitiesandstates. Socialscience&medicine(    ),  ( ):
    –  ,March    . URL
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/        .
[  ] AngusDeatonandDarrenLubotsky. Incomeinequalityandmortalityin
U.S.cities: Weighingtheevidence.AresponsetoAsh. Socialscience&
medicine(    ),  (  ):    – ,June    . doi:
  .    /j.socscimed.    .  .   . URL
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/        .
   [  ] MichelleL.DionandVickiBirch eld. EconomicDevelopment,Income
Inequality,andPreferencesforRedistribution. InternationalStudies
Quarterly,  ( ):   –   ,June    . doi:
  .    /j.    -    .    .     .x. URL
http://doi.wiley.com/  .    /j.    -    .    .     .x.
[  ] Sco EidelmanandChristianS.Crandall. APsychologicalAdvantagefor
theStatusQuo. InJohnT.Jost,AaronC.Kay,andHulda orisdo ir,
editors,Socialandpsychologicalbasesofideologyandsystemjusti cation,
chapter ,pages  –   .OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,    .
[  ] M.D.R.EvansandJonathanKelley. PopulationSize,Economic
Development,andA itudesTowardsInequality: Evidencefrom  
Nations. PopulationReview,  ( ): –  ,    .
[  ] ArminFalk,IgoMenrath,PabloEmilioVerde,andJohannesSiegrist.
CardiovascularConsequencesofUnfairPay. InstitutefortheStudyofLabor
DiscussionPaper,(    ),    .
[  ] JamesFearonandDavidLaitin. Ethnicity,Insurgency,andCivilWar.
AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,  ( ):  –  ,    .
[  ] HenningFinseraas. IncomeInequalityandDemandforRedistribution: A
MultilevelAnalysisofEuropeanPublicOpinion. ScandinavianPolitical
Studies,  ( ):  –   ,March    . doi:   .    /j.    -    .    .     .x.
URLhttp://doi.wiley.com/  .    /j.    -    .    .     .x.
[  ] APSATaskForce. AmericanDemocracyinanAgeofRisingInequality.
PerspectivesonPolitics, ( ):   –   ,    .
[  ] RobertHFrank. FallingBehind: HowRisingInequalityHarmstheMiddle
Class. UniversityofCaliforniaPress,Berkeley,    .
[  ] RobertHFrank,AdamSethLevine,andOegeDijk. Expenditure
Cascades(WorkingPaper).     .
[  ]  omasFrank. What’stheMa erwithKansas. MetropolitanBooks,New
York,    .
[  ] RichardB.Freeman. (Some)InequalityIsGoodforYou. InDavidB.
GruskyandTamarKricheli-Katz,editors, eNewGildedAge:  eCritical
   InequalityDebatesofOurTime,pages  –  .StanfordUniversityPress,
Stanford,    .
[  ] SandroGalea,MelissaTracy,KatherineJHogga ,CharlesDimaggio,and
AdamKarpati. EstimatedDeathsA ributabletoSocialFactorsinthe
UnitedStates. Americanjournalofpublichealth,June    . doi:
  .    /AJPH.    .      . URL
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/        .
[  ] AndrewGelman,DavidPark,BorisShor,andJeronimoCortina. Red
State,BlueState,RichState,PoorState: WhyAmericansVotetheWay ey
Do. PrincetonUniversityPress,Princeton,    .
[  ] AndreasGeorgiadisandAlanManning. SpenditlikeBeckham?
InequalityandredistributionintheUK,    –    . PublicChoice,   
( - ):   –   ,January    . doi:   .    /s     -   -    - . URL
http:
//www.springerlink.com/index/  .    /s     -   -    - .
[  ] MéroveGijsberts.  eLegitimationofIncomeInequalityin
State-socialistandMarketSocieties. ActaSociologica,  ( ):   –   ,
December    . doi:   .    /                  . URL
http://www.informaworld.com/openurl?genre=
article&doi=  .    /                  &magic=crossref|
|D   A  C BB      B A   AFFD  AE .
[  ] MartinGilens. WhyAmericanshatewelfare: race,media,andthepoliticsof
antipovertypolicy. UniversityofChicagoPress,Chicago,    .
[  ] MartinGilens. AﬄuenceandIn uence: EconomicInequalityandPolitical
PowerinAmerica. PrincetonUniversityPress,Princeton,    .
[  ] PeterGo schalkandSheldonDanziger. InequalityofWageRates,
EarningsandFamilyIncomeintheUnitedStates,    -    . Reviewof
IncomeandWealth,  ( ):   –   ,    .
[  ] JeﬀreyEdwardGreen. RawlsandtheForgo enFigureoftheMost
Advantaged: InDefenseofReasonableEnvytowardtheSuperrich.
AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,   (  ):   –   ,January    . doi:
  .    /S                . URLhttp:
//www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S                .
   [  ] J.S.HackerandP.Pierson. Winner-Take-AllPolitics: PublicPolicy,
PoliticalOrganization,andthePrecipitousRiseofTopIncomesinthe
UnitedStates. Politics&Society,  ( ):   –   ,May    . doi:
  .    /                . URL
http://pas.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/  / /   .
[  ] M.Hadler. WhyDoPeopleAcceptDiﬀerentIncomeRatios? A
Multi-levelComparisonof irtyCountries. ActaSociologica,  ( ):
   –   ,June    . doi:   .    /                . URL
http://asj.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/  .    /                .
[  ] CarolynL.HaferandBeckyL.Choma. BeliefinaJustWorld,Perceived
Fairness,andJusti cationoftheStatusQuo. InSocialandpsychological
basesofideologyandsystemjusti cation,chapter ,pages   –   .Oxford
UniversityPress,Oxford,    .
[  ] BarbaraHeyns. EmergingInequalitiesinCentralandEasternEurope.
AnnualReviewofSociology,  ( ):   –   ,August    . doi:
  .    /annurev.soc.  .      .      . URL
http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/  .    /annurev.
soc.  .      .      .
[  ] JenniferHochschild. What’sFair? AmericanBeliefsaboutDistributive
Justice. HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,    .
[  ] TorbenIversenandDavidSoskice. ElectoralInstitutionsandthePolitics
ofCoalitions: WhySomeDemocraciesRedistributeMore anOthers.
AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,   ( ):   –   ,    .
[  ] ShantoIyengar. FramingResponsibilityforPoliticalIssues:  eCaseof
Poverty. PoliticalBehavior,  ( ):  –  ,    .
[  ] LawrenceR.Jacobsand edaSkocpol. InequalityandAmerican
Democracy: WhatWeKnowandWhatWeNeedtoLearn. RussellSage
Foundation,    .
[  ] GuillerminaJasso. HowMuchInjusticeis ereintheWorld? TwoNew
JusticeIndexes. AmericanSociologicalReview,  ( ):   –   ,    .
[  ] GuillerminaJasso. TrendsintheExperienceofInjustice: JusticeIndexes
AboutEarningsinSixSocieties,    –    . SocialJusticeResearch,  
( ):   –   ,    .
   [  ] CharlesI.JonesandPeterJ.Klenow. BeyondGDP?Welfareacross
CountriesandTime. NBERWorkingPaperSeries,September    . URL
http://papers.nber.org/papers/w     .
[  ] JohnJostandOrsolyaHunyady.  epsychologyofsystemjusti cation
andthepalliativefunctionofideology. EuropeanReviewofSocial
Psychology,  ( ):   –   ,    .
[  ] JohnTJostandMahzarinRBanaji.  eroleofstereotypingin
system-justi cationandtheproductionoffalseconsciousness. British
JournalofSocialPsychology,  : –  ,    .
[  ] JohnT.JostandOrsolyaHunyady. AntecedentsandConsequencesof
System-JustifyingIdeologies. CurrentDirectionsinPsychologicalScience,  
( ):   –   ,October    . doi:   .    /j.    -    .    .     .x. URL
http://cdp.sagepub.com/lookup/doi/  .    /j.    -    .
    .     .x.
[  ] JohnTJost,JGlaser,AWKruglanski,andFSulloway. Political
conservatismasmotivatedsocialcognition. PsychologicalBulletin,   :
   –   ,    .
[  ] JohnTJost,MahzarinRBanaji,andBrianANosek. ADecadeofSystem
Justi cation eory: AccumulatedEvidenceofConsciousand
UnconsciousBolsteringoftheStatusQuo. PoliticalPsychology,  ( ):
   –   ,    .
[  ] RobertSKahn,PaulHWise,BrucePKennedy,andIchiroKawachi. State
incomeinequality,householdincome,andmaternalmentalandphysical
health: crosssectionalnationalsurvey. BritishMedicalJournal,   :
    –    ,    .
[  ] DanielKahnemanandAmosTversky. Prospect eory: AnAnalysisof
DecisionunderRisk. Econometrica,  ( ):   –   ,    . URL
http://www.jstor.org/stable/       .
[  ] E.KarakocandB.Baskan. ReligioninPolitics: HowDoesInequality
AﬀectPublicSecularization? ComparativePoliticalStudies,  (  ):
    –    ,August    . doi:   .    /                . URL
http://cps.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/  .    /                .
   [  ] TerryLynnKarl. EconomicInequalityandDemocraticInstability.
JournalOfDemocracy,  ( ):   –   ,    .
[  ] RobertR.Kaufman. InequalityandRedistribution: SomeContinuing
Puzzles. PS:PoliticalScience&Politics,  (  ):   ,September    . doi:
  .    /S                . URLhttp://www.journals.
cambridge.org/abstract_S                .
[  ] IchiroKawachiandBruceKennedy. Health,Inequality,andEconomic
Development. JournalofEconomicLiterature,XLI(March):   –   ,    .
[  ] A.C.KayandJ.Friesen. OnSocialStabilityandSocialChange:
UnderstandingWhenSystemJusti cationDoesandDoesNotOccur.
CurrentDirectionsinPsychologicalScience,  ( ):   –   ,December
    . doi:   .    /                . URLhttp:
//cdp.sagepub.com/lookup/doi/  .    /                .




socialpsychology,  ( ):   –  ,September    . doi:   .    /a       .
URLhttp://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/        .
[  ] JKelleyandKZagorski. EconomicChangeandtheLegitimationof
Inequality: theTransitionFromSocialismTotheFreeMarketin
Central-EastEurope. ResearchinSocialStrati cationandMobility,  :
   –   ,    . doi:   .    /S    -    (  )     -X. URLhttp://
linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S               X.
[  ] JonathanKelleyandM.D.R.Evans.  eLegitimationofInequality:
OccupationalEarningsinNineNations. AmericanJournalofSociology,  
( ):  ,July    . doi:   .    /      . URL
http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/  .    /      .
[  ] NathanJ.KellyandPeterK.Enns. InequalityandtheDynamicsofPublic
Opinion:  eSelf-ReinforcingLinkBetweenEconomicInequalityand
MassPreferences. AmericanJournalofPoliticalScience,  ( ):   –   ,
July    . doi:   .    /j.    -    .    .     .x. URL
http://doi.wiley.com/  .    /j.    -    .    .     .x.
   [  ] BPKennedy,IKawachi,RGlass,andDProthrow-Stith. Income
distribution,socioeconomicstatus,andselfratedhealthintheUnited
States: multilevelanalysis. BMJ(Clinicalresearched.),   (    ):   –  ,
October    . URL
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?
artid=     &tool=pmcentrez&rendertype=abstract.
[  ] L.KenworthyandL.McCall. Inequality,publicopinionand
redistribution. Socio-EconomicReview, ( ):  –  ,December    . doi:
  .    /ser/mwm   . URLhttp:
//ser.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/doi/  .    /ser/mwm   .
[  ] JamesRKluegelandE.R.Smith. Beliefsaboutinequality: Americans’views
ofwhatisandwhatoughttobe. AldineDeGruyter,NewYork,    .




science&medicine(    ),  ( ):   – ,September    . doi:
  .    /j.socscimed.    .  .   . URL
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?
artid=       &tool=pmcentrez&rendertype=abstract.
[  ] CarlEvere LaddandKarlynH.Bowman. A itudesTowardEconomic
Inequality. AmericanEnterpriseInstitute,Washington,D.C.,    .
[  ] RobertE.Lane.  eFearofEquality.  eAmericanPoliticalScience
Review,  ( ):  –  ,    . URL
http://www.jstor.org/stable/       .
[  ] KristinLaurin,GrainneM.Fitzsimons,andAaronC.Kay. Social
disadvantageandtheself-regulatoryfunctionofjusticebeliefs. Journalof
PersonalityandSocialPsychology,    a.
[  ] KristinLaurin,StevenShepherd,andAaronCKay. Restrictedemigration,
systeminescapability,anddefenseofthestatusquo: system-justifying
consequencesofrestrictedexitopportunities. Psychologicalscience,  ( ):
    –  ,August    b. doi:   .    /                . URL
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/        .
   [  ] KayteLawton,NickPearce,TonyDolphin,GlennGo fried,andAndy
Stuckey. Ge ingWhatWeDeserve? Technicalreport,InstituteforPublic
PolicyResearch,London,    .
[  ] RobynaLeBoeufandEldarSha r. Anchoringonthe“here”and“now”in
timeanddistancejudgments. Journalofexperimentalpsychology.Learning,
memory,andcognition,  ( ):  –  ,January    . doi:   .    /a       .
URLhttp://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/        .
[  ] AndrewLeigh,ChristopherJencks,andTimothyMSmeeding. Health
andEconomicInequality. InWSalverda,BNolan,andTSmeeding,
editors, eOxfordHandbookofEconomicInequality,chapter  ,pages
   –   .OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,    .
[  ] MelvinJ.LernerandDaleT.Miller. Justworldresearchandthe
a ributionprocess: Lookingbackandahead. PsychologicalBulletin,  
( ):    –    ,    . doi:   .    /    -    .  . .    . URL
http://content.apa.org/journals/bul/  / /    .
[  ] IsaacLipkus.  eConstructionandPreliminaryValidationofaGlobal
BeliefinaJustWorldScaleandtheExploratoryAnalysisofthe
MultidimensionalBeliefinaJustWorldScale. JournalofPersonality,  
(  ):    –    ,    .
[  ] IsaacLipkusandIleneC.Siegler.  eBeliefinaJustWorldand
PerceptionsofDiscrimination.  eJournalofPsychology,   ( ):
   –   ,    .
[  ] OlaListhaugandTorilAalberg. ComparativePublicOpinionon
DistributiveJustice. InternationalJournalofComparativeSociology,  :
   –   ,    .
[  ] IdoLiviatanandJohnT.Jost. SpecialIssue: SystemJusti cation eory.
MotivatedSocialCognitionintheServiceoftheStatusQuo. Social
Cognition,  ( ):   –   ,    .
[  ] Ma hewLovelessandStephenWhite eld. Beingunequalandseeing
inequality: Explainingthepoliticalsigni canceofsocialinequalityinnew
marketdemocracies. EuropeanJournalofPoliticalResearch,  ( ):
   –   ,March    . doi:   .    /j.    -    .    .     .x. URL
http://doi.wiley.com/  .    /j.    -    .    .     .x.
   [  ] XiaoboLü. PublicGoodsProvision,InequalityofOpportunity,and
A itudesTowardIncomeInequality(WorkingPaper).     .
[  ] NoamLupuandJonasPontusson.  eStructureofInequalityandthe
PoliticsofRedistribution. AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,   ( ): –  ,
May    . doi:   .    /S                . URLhttp:
//www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S                .
[  ] ErzoF.P.Lu merandMonicaSinghal. Culture,Context,andtheTaste
forRedistribution. NBERWorkingPaper,    . URL
http://www.nber.org/papers/w     .
[  ] VincentAMahler. EconomicGlobalization,DomesticPolitics,and
IncomeInequalityintheDevelopedCountries. ComparativePolitical
Studies,  ( ):    –    ,    .
[  ] JeﬀManza. UnequalDemocracyinAmerica:  eLongView. InDavid
GruskyandTamarKricheli-Katz,editors, eNewGildedAge:  eCritical
InequalityDebatesofOurTime,pages   –   .StanfordUniversityPress,
Stanford,    .
[  ] IsabelaMares. SocialProtectionaroundtheWorld: ExternalInsecurity,
StateCapacityandDomesticPoliticalCleavages. ComparativePolitical
Studies,  ( ):   –  ,    .
[  ] GordonMarshall,AdamSwi ,DavidRouth,andCaroleBurgoyne. What
IsandWhatOughttoBe: PopularBeliefsAboutDistributiveJusticein
 irteenCountries. EuropeanSociologicalReview,  ( ):   –   ,    .
[   ] KarlMarxandFriedrichEngels.  eCommunistManifesto. Oxford
UniversityPress,    .
[   ] LeslieMcCall.  eUndeservingRich: BeliefsaboutInequality,Opportunity,
andRedistributioninAmericanSociety. CambridgeUniversityPress,
Cambridge,    .
[   ] LeslieMcCallandLaneKenworthy. Americans’SocialPolicyPreferences
intheEraofRisingInequality. PerspectivesonPolitics, (  ):   ,August
    . doi:   .    /S                . URLhttp:
//www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S                .
   [   ] LeslieMcCallandChristinePercheski. IncomeInequality: NewTrends
andResearchDirections. AnnualReviewofSociology,  ( ):   –   ,
June    . doi:   .    /annurev.soc.      .      . URL
http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/  .    /annurev.
soc.      .      .
[   ] ByElizabethMcNichol,DouglasHall,DavidCooper,andVincent
Palacios. AState-by-StateAnalysisofIncomeTrends. Technicalreport,
CenteronBudgetandPolicyPriorities,Washington,D.C.,    .
[   ] JenniferM.MellorandJeﬀreyMilyo. IncomeInequalityandHealthStatus
intheUnitedStates: EvidencefromtheCurrentPopulationSurvey.  e
JournalofHumanResources,  ( ):   ,    . doi:   .    /       . URL
http://www.jstor.org/stable/       ?origin=crossref.
[   ] AllanHMeltzerandSco FRichard. ARational eoryoftheSizeof
Government. JournalofPoliticalEconomy,  ( ):   –   ,    .
[   ] TamarMendelson,RebeccaC urston,andLauraDKubzansky.
Aﬀectiveandcardiovasculareﬀectsofexperimentally-inducedsocial
status. Healthpsychology: oﬃcialjournaloftheDivisionofHealth
Psychology,AmericanPsychologicalAssociation,  ( ):   – ,July    .
doi:   .    /    -    .  . .   . URL
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/        .
[   ] BMilanovic.  emedian-voterhypothesis,incomeinequality,and
incomeredistribution: anempiricaltestwiththerequireddata. European
JournalofPoliticalEconomy,  ( ):   –   ,September    . doi:
  .    /S    -    (  )     - . URLhttp://linkinghub.
elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S                .
[   ] EdwardNMuller. Democracy,EconomicDevelopmentandIncome
Inequality. AmericanSociologicalReview,  ( ):  –  ,    .
[   ] EdwardNMuller. EconomicDeterminantsofDemocracy. American
SociologicalReview,  ( ):   –   ,    .
[   ] JaimeLNapierandJohnTJost. Whyareconservativeshappierthan
liberals? Psychologicalscience,  ( ):   –  ,June    . doi:
  .    /j.    -    .    .     .x. URL
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/        .
   [   ] KathrynM.NeckermanandFlorenciaTorche. Inequality: Causesand
Consequences. AnnualReviewofSociology,  ( ):   –   ,August    .
doi:   .    /annurev.soc.  .      .      . URL
http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/  .    /annurev.
soc.  .      .      .
[   ] ManiNepal,AlokK.Bohara,andKishoreGawande. MoreInequality,
MoreKillings:  eMaoistInsurgencyinNepal. AmericanJournalof
PoliticalScience,  ( ):   –   ,July    . doi:
  .    /j.    -    .    .     .x. URL
http://doi.wiley.com/  .    /j.    -    .    .     .x.
[   ] MichaelI.NortonandDanAriely. BuildingaBe erAmerica-One
WealthQuintileataTime. PerspectivesonPsychologicalScience, ( ): –  ,
    .
[   ] L.OsbergandT.Smeeding. ”Fair”Inequality? A itudestowardPay
Diﬀerentials:  eUnitedStatesinComparativePerspective. American
SociologicalReview,  ( ):   –   ,June    . doi:
  .    /                  . URL
http://asr.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/  .    /                  .
[   ] BenjaminI.PageandLawrenceR.Jacobs. ClassWar: WhatAmericans
Really inkAboutEconomicInequality. UniversityofChicagoPress,
Chicago,    .
[   ] BenjaminI.Page,LarryM.Bartels,andJasonSeawright. Democracyand
thePolicyPreferencesofWealthyAmericans. PerspectivesonPolitics,  
(  ):  –  ,March    . doi:   .    /S               X. URLhttp:
//www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S               X.
[   ] MariiPaskovandCarolineDewilde. Incomeinequalityandsolidarityin
Europe. ResearchinSocialStrati cationandMobility,  ( ):   –   ,
December    . doi:   .    /j.rssm.    .  .   . URLhttp://
linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S                .
[   ]  omasPike y. SocialMobilityandRedistributivePolitics.  eQuarterly
JournalofEconomics,   ( ):   –   ,    .
[   ]  omasPike yandEmmanuelSaez.  eEvolutionofTopIncomes: A
HistoricalandInternationalPerspective. AmericanEconomicReview,  
   ( ):   –   ,May    . doi:   .    /                  . URL
http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/abs/  .    /                  .
[   ] JonasPontusson. InequalityandEconomicGrowthinComparative
Perspective. InDavidGruskyandTamarKricheli-Katz,editors, eNew
GildedAge:  eCriticalInequalityDebatesofOurTime,pages  –   .
StanfordUniversityPress,Stanford,    .
[   ] JohnE.Roemer,WoojinLee,andKarinevanderStraeten. Racism,
xenophobia,anddistribution: multi-issuepoliticsinadvanceddemocracies.
RussellSageFoundation,NewYork,    .
[   ] JesperRoineandDanielWaldenström.  eEvolutionofTopIncomesin
anEgalitarianSociety;Sweden,    -    . ResearchInstituteofIndustrial
EconomicsWorkingPaper,(   ),    .
[   ] DavidRuedaandJonasPontusson. WageInequalityandVarietiesof
Capitalism. WorldPolitics,  ( ):   –   ,    .
[   ] E.Saar. DiﬀerentCohortsandEvaluationofIncomeDiﬀerencesin
Estonia. InternationalSociology,  ( ):   –   ,May    . doi:
  .    /                . URL
http://iss.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/  .    /                .
[   ] W.SamuelsonandRichardJZeckhauser. Status-quobiasindecision
making. JournalofRiskandUncertainty, : –  ,    .
[   ] KennethScheveandDavidStasavage. ReligionandPreferencesforSocial
Insurance. QuarterlyJournalofPoliticalScience, (May):   –   ,    .
doi:   .   /   .        .
[   ] KayLehmanSchlozman,SidneyVerba,andHenryBrady.  eUnheavenly
Chorus: UnequalPoliticalVoiceandtheBrokenPromiseofAmerican
Democracy. PrincetonUniversityPress,Princeton,    .
[   ] IanShapiro. WhythePoorDon’tSoaktheRich. Daedalus,   ( ):
   –   ,    .
[   ] MosesShayo. AModelofSocialIdentitywithanApplicationtoPolitical
Economy: Nation,Class,andRedistribution. AmericanPoliticalScience
Review,   ( ):   –   ,    . URLdoi:  .    /S                .
   [   ] TimothyM.Smeeding. PublicPolicy,EconomicInequality,andPoverty:
 eUnitedStatesinComparativePerspective. SocialScienceQuarterly,  
(s ):   –   ,December    . doi:   .    /j.    -    .    .     .x.
URLhttp://doi.wiley.com/  .    /j.    -    .    .     .x.
[   ] HillelDavidSoifer.  eRedistributive reat: StatePowerandtheEﬀect
ofInequalityonDemocracy. BrooksWorldPovertyInstituteWorkingPaper,
    .
[   ] FrederickSolt. StandardizingtheWorldIncomeInequalityDatabase.
SocialScienceQuarterly,  ( ):   –  ,    .
[   ] FrederickSolt. DoesEconomicInequalityDepressElectoral
Participation? TestingtheScha schneiderHypothesis. PoliticalBehavior,
  ( ):   –   ,    . doi:   .    /s     -   -    - . URLhttp:
//www.springerlink.com/index/  .    /s     -   -    - .
[   ] FredrickSolt. EconomicInequalityandDemocraticPolitical
Engagement. AmericanJournalofPoliticalScience,  ( ):  –  ,    .
[   ] AlfredStepanandJuanJ.Linz. ComparativePerspectivesonInequality
andtheQualityofDemocracyintheUnitedStates. PerspectivesonPolitics,
 (  ):   –   ,December    . doi:   .    /S                . URL
http:
//www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S                .
[   ] SVSubramanianandIchiroKawachi.  eassociationbetweenstate
incomeinequalityandworsehealthisnotconfoundedbyrace.
InternationalJournalofEpidemiology,  ( ):    –    ,    . doi:
  .    /ije/dyg   .
[   ] StefanSvallfors. DimensionsofInequality: AComparisonofA itudesin
SwedenandBritain. EuropeanSociologicalReview, ( ):   –   ,    .
[   ] StefanSvallfors. WorldsofWelfareandA itudestoRedistribution: A
ComparisonofEightWesternNations. EuropeanSociologicalReview,  
( ):   –   ,    .
[   ] E orbecke. EconomicInequalityandItsSocioeconomicImpact. World
Development,  ( ):    –    ,September    . doi:
  .    /S    -   X(  )     - . URLhttp://linkinghub.
elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S       X        .
   [   ] AmosTverskyandDanielKahneman. Judgmentunderuncertainty:
Heuristicsandbiases. Science,   :    –    ,    .
[   ] JojannekevanderToorn,PaulR.Nail,IdoLiviatan,andJohnT.Jost. My
Country,RightorWrong: ActivatingSystemJusti cationMotivation
EliminatestheLiberal-ConservativeGapinPatrioticA achment
(WorkingPaper).     .
[   ] SidneyVerbaandGaryOrren. EqualityinAmerica:  eView omtheTop.
HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,MA,    .
[   ] RolandVerwiebeandBerndWegener. SocialInequalityandthePerceived
IncomeJusticeGap. SocialJusticeResearch,  ( ):   –   ,    .
[   ] SarahVoitchovsky. InequalityandEconomicGrowth. InWiemer
Salverda,BrianNolvan,andTimothyM.Smeeding,editors,Oxford
HandbookofEconomicInequality,chapter  ,pages   –   .Oxford
UniversityPress,Oxford,    .
[   ] CherylJWakslakandPatrickBauer. SpreadingRationalization: Increased
SupportforLarge-ScaleandSmall-ScaleSocialSystemsFollowingSystem
 reat. SocialCognition,  ( ):   –   ,    .
[   ] EvaWegnerandMiquelPellicer. DemandforRedistributioninSouth
Africa(WorkingPaper).     .
[   ] RichardG.WilkinsonandKatePicke .  espiritlevel: whymoreequal
societiesalmostalwaysdobe er. Penguin,London,    .
[   ] PingXuandJamesCGarand. EconomicContextandAmericans’
PerceptionsofIncomeInequality. SocialScienceQuarterly,  ( ):
    –    ,    .
[   ] Jong-sungYou. SocialTrust: FairnessMa ersMore anHomogeneity.
PoliticalPsychology,  ( ):   –   ,July    . doi:
  .    /j.    -    .    .     .x. URL
http://doi.wiley.com/  .    /j.    -    .    .     .x.
[   ] R.B.Zajonc. A itudinaleﬀectsofmereexposure. JournalofPersonality
andSocialPsychologyMonograph, ( (Pt. )): –  ,    .
   [   ] EmilyMZitekandLarissaZTiedens.  e uencyofsocialhierarchy:  e
easewithwhichhierarchicalrelationshipsareseen,remembered,learned,
andliked. Journalofpersonalityandsocialpsychology,September    .
doi:   .    /a       . URL
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/        .
   Colophon
T
                   
usingL ATEX,originallydevelopedby
LeslieLamportandbasedonDonald
Knuth’sTEX. ebodytextissetin  point
ArnoPro,designedbyRobertSlimbachin
thestyleofbooktypesfromtheAldinePress
inVenice,andissuedbyAdobein    . A
template,whichcanbeusedtoformataPhD
thesiswiththislookandfeel,hasbeen




   